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Abstract
Recent empirical studies of dividend taxation have found that: (1) dividend tax cuts cause
large, immediate increases in dividend payouts, and (2) the increases are driven by rms
with high levels of share ownership among top executives or the board of directors. These
ndings are inconsistent with existing theories of dividend taxation. We show that an
agency model in which managers and shareholders have conicting interests explains the
evidence. In this model, dividend taxation encourages managers to divert earnings into
unproductive projects instead of paying out prots to shareholders and therefore creates
a rst-order deadweight cost. In contrast, corporate taxes do not distort the manager's
choice between payouts and unproductive investment and may only create second-order
eciency costs. Corporate income taxation may therefore be a more ecient way to gen-
erate revenue than dividend taxation, challenging existing intuitions based on neoclassical
models.
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The 2003 dividend tax reform in the U.S. has sparked a new wave of research on the eects
of dividend and corporate taxation (Chetty and Saez (2005), Brown et al. (2007), Nam et al.
(2004)). Chetty and Saez document four empirical results: (1) Regular dividends rose sharply
after the 2003 tax cut, with an implied net-of-tax elasticity of dividend payments of 0.75. (2)
The response was very rapid { total dividend payouts rose by 20% within one year of enactment
{ and was stronger among rms with high levels of accumulated assets. (3) The response was
much larger among rms where top executives owned a larger fraction of outstanding shares
(see also Brown et al. (2007) and Nam et al. (2004)). (4) The response was much larger among
rms with large shareholders on the board of directors.
It is dicult to reconcile these four ndings with either of the two leading theories of cor-
porate taxation { the \old view" (Harberger 1962, 1966, Feldstein 1970, Poterba and Summers
1985) and the \new view" (Auerbach 1979, Bradford 1981, King 1977). The increase in div-
idends appears to support the old view because dividends should not respond to permanent
dividend tax changes under the new view.1 However, the increase in dividend payments is too
rapid to be explained by the supply-side investment mechanism of the old view model.2 The
rapid dividend payout response could potentially be explained by incorporating a signaling value
for dividends as in Poterba and Summers (1985) or Bernheim (1991).3 However, neither signal-
ing models nor the standard old and new view models directly predict ndings (3) and (4) on
the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the dividend payout response by rm ownership structure.4
In this paper, we propose a simple alternative model of dividend and corporate income
taxation that matches the four empirical ndings based on the agency theory of the rm (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). The critical feature of the model is a divergence between the preferences of
1One way of reconciling the dividend increase with the new view is if the tax cut was perceived as temporary
by rms. However, Auerbach and Hassett (2007) document that the share prices of immature rms that are
predicted to pay dividends in the future rose when the reform was announced, suggesting that rms perceived
the tax cut as fairly permanent.
2Poterba's (2004) estimates using an old view model implied that the 2003 tax reform would increase dividend
payments by 20 percent in the long run, but that only a quarter of the long-run eect would occur within three
years after the tax cut.
3There is debate in the corporate nance literature about the signal content of dividends. Conditional on
information available at time t, dividend increases have little predictive power for future earnings (see e.g.,
Bernartzi et al. 1997, Grullon et al. 2005).
4The empirical evidence is also not fully explained by Sinn's (1991) \life cycle" model in which rms progress
from the old view to the new view. In that model, the payout response should be smaller among rms with
higher levels of accumulated assets, but the data exhibit the opposite pattern.
1managers and shareholders. We model this divergence as arising from perks and pet projects,
although the underlying source of the conict between managers and shareholders does not
matter for our analysis. Shareholders can provide incentives to managers to invest and pay
out dividends through costly monitoring and pay-for-performance. Only the large shareholders
of the rm choose to monitor the rm in equilibrium (Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 1997). In
this model, a dividend tax cut leads to an immediate increase in dividend payments because it
increases the manager's preference for dividends relative to the pet project and increases the
amount of monitoring by large shareholders. Firms where managers place more weight on prot
maximization { either because the manager owns a large number of shares or because there are
more large shareholders { are more likely to increase dividends in response to a tax cut.
After showing that the positive predictions of the agency model t the recent evidence
on dividend taxation, we characterize its implications for the eciency costs of dividend and
corporate taxation by deriving empirically implementable formulas for excess burden. We
obtain two results that challenge intuitions from existing neoclassical models. First, dividend
taxes create a deadweight cost even if the marginal source of investment is retained earnings
by distorting the tradeo between pet project investment and dividend payouts. Second, if
the contract between shareholders and the manager is second-best inecient { as is the case in
a model with diuse shareholders { dividend taxation creates a rst-order eciency cost. In
contrast, the corporate tax may generate only standard second-order eciency costs because
it does not amplify the manager's incentive to hoard cash for pet projects.5 This suggests
that corporate taxes may be a more ecient way to generate revenue than dividend taxes.
Indeed, our analysis suggest that a Pigouvian dividend subsidy would be desirable to correct
the negative externality created by agency problems in rms.
The most important limitation of our analysis is that it does not explicitly model share
repurchases, which give rms a way to return money to shareholders without paying dividend
taxes. In the appendix, we extend the model to permit costly share repurchases, as in Poterba
and Summers (1985). The formulas for excess burden remain the same, but the rst-order
agency-related term depends upon the elasticity of total payouts (share repurchases plus divi-
dends) with respect to taxes. Intuitively, dividend taxes do not have rst-order eciency costs
if they simply induce substitution between dividends and repurchases without changing pet
5The corporate tax does not always have second-order eciency costs in our model; if it distorts the manager's
contract, it too may generate rst-order eciency costs.
2project investment. Note that this extension of our analysis relies on a reduced form model
for share repurchases and hence does not explain the puzzle of why rms pay dividends even
though dividends are tax-disadvantaged. Understanding the microeconomic foundations of the
cost of share repurchases is an issue of great importance for future work, independent of its
potential implications for taxation.
This paper is related to two contemporaneous theoretical studies motivated by evidence
from the 2003 dividend tax cut. Gordon and Dietz (2006) contrast the eects of dividend
taxation in new view, signaling, and agency models and conclude that the agency model is most
likely to t the empirical evidence. The central dierence between our model and Gordon and
Dietz's agency model is in the assumption about which agent sets the rm's dividend policy.
Gordon and Dietz assume that dividend payout decisions are made by shareholders, whereas we
assume that they are made by management. This leads to dierent results in both the positive
and eciency analysis. Gordon and Dietz's model does not directly predict a link between
executive or board share ownership and behavioral responses to dividend taxation. Taxing
dividends does not create a rst-order distortion in their model, since dividends are always
set at the second-best ecient level by shareholders. Their model does, however, generate the
empirically validated prediction that dividend policies change rarely over time, which our model
does not produce. Our model and Gordon and Dietz's analysis should therefore be viewed as
complementary eorts to explain dierent aspects of dividend policies.
A second recent study is Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), who build on Sinn's (1991) model to
analyze the eects of temporary changes in dividend tax rates. They incorporate nancing
constraints and establish new results on intertemporal tax arbitrage opportunities for rms. In
contrast with our model, Korinek and Stiglitz assume that retained earnings are allocated e-
ciently by the manager. As a result, they obtain the new view neutrality result that permanent
dividend tax policy changes have no eects on economic eciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a neoclassical
two period model that nests the old and new views as a benchmark. In section 3, we intro-
duce agency problems into the model and characterize manager and shareholder behavior. In
section 4, we characterize behavioral responses to dividend taxation and compare the agency
model's predictions with the recent empirical evidence. In section 5, we analyze the eciency
consequences of dividend and corporate taxation. Section 6 concludes.
32 The Old and New Views in a Two Period Model
We begin with a neoclassical two period model that nests the old and new views and serves as a
point of departure for our agency analysis. Consider a rm that has initial cash holdings of X
at the beginning of period 0. These cash holdings represent prots from past operations.6 The
rm can raise additional funds by issuing equity (E). The rm's manager can do two things
with the rm's cash holdings: pay out dividends or invest the money in a project that yields
revenue in the next period. Let I denote the level of investment and D = X +E  I the rm's
dividend payment in period 0. In period 1, the rm generates net prots of f(I), where f is a
strictly concave function.7 The rm then closes and returns its net-of-tax prots and principal
to shareholders.
The rms' prots are subject to two types of taxes. First, the rm pays a corporate tax at
rate tc on its net prots in period 1, so that net-of-corporate-tax prots are (1 tc)f(I). Second,
it pays a dividend tax at rate td on distributed prots in all periods. However, the principal
invested by shareholders is not subject to the dividend tax (E).8 Hence, the net-of-tax payout
in period 0 is (1   td)D and the net-of-tax payout in period 1 is (1   td)[(1   tc)f(X + E  
D) + X   D] + E. Investors can also purchase a government bond that pays a xed, untaxed
interest rate of r > 0 (which is unaected by the dividend tax rate).9
The manager's objective is to choose the level of equity issues and dividends (and investment)
that maximize the value of the rm:
max
D;E
V = (1   td)D   E +
(1   td)[(1   tc)f(X + E   D) + X   D] + E
1 + r
(1)
To characterize these choices, it is useful to distinguish between two cases: (1) A cash-rich rm,
which has retained prots X such that its net-of-corporate-tax marginal return (1 tc)f0(X)  r
and (2) a cash-constrained rm, which has cash X such that (1 tc)f0(X) > r. The \new view"
model considers rms of the rst type, while the \old view" pertains to rms of the second-type.
6We can allow part of the existing cash holdings X to represent the principal of shareholders without any
impact on the analysis as long as rms cannot return the principal before liquidation and rms do not choose
to distribute all their past prots in period 0.
7The gross production function is F(I) = f(I) + I; f(I) denotes prots net of the depreciation of capital
used for production.
8In the United States, distributed prots are considered dividends for tax purposes, but returning sharehold-
ers' principal is not considered a dividend.
9Throughout this paper, we abstract from general-equilibrium eects through which changes in td may aect
the equilibrium rate of return, r.
4Cash-Rich Firms { The New View. First observe that the rm will never set E > 0 and
D > 0 simultaneously. If a rm both issued equity and paid dividends, it could strictly increase
its value V by reducing both E and D by $1 and lowering its tax bill by $tdr=(1 + r). Now
consider the marginal value of issuing equity when D = 0 for the cash-rich rm:
@V
@E
(D = 0) =  1 +
(1   td)(1   tc)f0(X) + 1
1 + r
=
(1   td)(1   tc)f0(X)   r
1 + r
 0
This expression implies that a cash rich rm optimally sets E = 0. The optimal choice of
dividends satises the rst order condition
(1   tc)f
0(X   D
) = r
Cash rich rms invest to the point where the net-of-corporate-tax marginal product of invest-
ment f0(I) equals the return on investment in the bond, r. Increases in the corporate tax
rate reduce the level of investment, increase period 0 dividend payments, and reduce period 1
dividend payments. However, the dividend tax rate td has no impact on dividend payments
and investment levels. This is the classic \new view" dividend tax neutrality result (Auerbach
1979, Bradford 1981, King 1977). The source of this result is transparent in the two period
case: the (1 td) term factors out of the value function in equation (1) when E = 0. Dividend
taxation has no impact on the behavior of cash-rich rms because they must pay the dividend
tax regardless of whether they pay out prots in the current or next period. In contrast, the
corporate tax changes the relative price of paying out dividends immediately and investing to
earn further prots, and therefore distorts behavior.
Cash-Constrained Firms { The Old View: Now consider a rm with X such that (1  
tc)f0(X) > r. The marginal value of paying dividends when E = 0 for this \cash constrained"
rm is
@V
@D
(E = 0) = 1   td  
1   td
1 + r
[(1   tc)f
0(X) + 1] = (1   td)
r   (1   tc)f0(X)
1 + r
< 0.
A cash-constrained rm does not pays dividends in the rst period because its marginal product
of investment exceeds the interest rate. This rm therefore invests all the cash it has: I = X+E.
The optimal choice of equity issues is given by
E
 = 0 if (1   td)(1   tc)f
0(X) < r (2)
(1   td)(1   tc)f
0(X + E
) = r if (1   td)(1   tc)f
0(X)  r (3)
5These conditions show that rms which nance their marginal dollar of investment from new
equity issues invest to the point where the marginal net-of-dividend and corporate tax return
to investment equals the return on investment in the bond, r. Firms that have X suciently
large so that (1   td)(1   tc)f0(X) < r have a net-of-tax return below the interest rate for the
rst dollar of equity. These \medium cash" rms choose the corner solution of no equity (and
no dividends) because of the tax wedge.
Unlike for cash-rich rms, the dividend tax distorts the behavior of low cash rms. Implicit
dierentiation of (3) shows that increases in td reduce equity issues and investment (@I=@td < 0,
@E=@td < 0). This is because the (1   td) term does not factor out of the value function in
equation (1) when D = 0 and E > 0. Intuitively, a dividend tax increase lowers the marginal
product of investment but does not aect the price of investment for cash-constrained rms.
Firms therefore reduce investment, issue less equity, and pay fewer dividends in period 2, the
classic \old view" predictions (Poterba and Summers 1985). Corporate taxes produce the
same eects because they aect the value of cash-constrained rms in exactly the same way as
dividend taxes. Note that dividend payments are not aected by tax changes in the short-run.
Following a dividend or corporate tax change, investment and equity issues respond immediately
(period 0), and dividends change only when the additional investment pays o (period 1).
Eciency Costs. Finally, we characterize the eciency cost of introducing a dividend and
corporate tax for the two types of rms. Let
Pd = D + [(1   tc)f(I) + X   D]=(1 + r)
denote the dividend tax base, i.e. the total dividend payout over the two periods, and
Pc = f(I)=(1 + r)
denote the corporate tax base. Total surplus in the economy is W = V + tdPd + tcPc. Using
the envelope conditions, dierentiating (1) yields dV=dtd =  Pd and dV=dtc =  (1   td)Pc.
Therefore, we obtain the standard Harberger-type formulas for marginal deadweight burden:
dW
dtd
= td
dPd
dtd
+ tc
dPc
dtd
(4)
dW
dtc
= td(
dPd
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc
) + tc
dPc
dtc
(5)
where
@Pd
@tc =  Pc denotes the mechanical eect of increasing tc on the rm's payout and
dPd
dtc  
@Pd
@tc thus measures the distortion in dividend payments created by the corporate tax due to
6behavioral responses. Equations (4) and (5) apply to both cash-rich and cash-constrained
rms. To obtain further insight into the key determinants of excess burden, it is helpful to
consider the old and new view rms separately.
For new view rms, dividend taxes do not distort behavior:
dPd
dtd = dPc
dtd = 0. In addition,
because these rms choose D and I to maximize Pd itself,
dPd
dtc =  Pc. Hence, for new view
rms, the formulas for excess burden simplify to:
dW
dtd
= 0 (6)
dW
dtc
= tc
dPc
dtc
(7)
Intuitively, an increase in tc does not distort total dividend payments because the marginal
reduction in period 1 dividends is cancelled out by the marginal increase in period 0 dividends
for a prot maximizing rm. As a result, the only distortionary eect of the corporate tax
comes from its eect on the corporate tax base itself.
For old view rms, dividend and corporate taxes both distort the return to investment in
the same way, implying dPc
dtd = dPc
dtc . Because old view rms pay dividends only in period 1,
the eects of td and tc on the dividend tax base are fully determined by their eects on prots,
which equal the corporate tax base:
dPd
dtd = (1 tc)dPc
dtd and
dPd
dtc =  Pc +(1 tc)dPc
dtc . Combining
these results, we obtain
dW
dtd
=
dW
dtc
= (tc + td   tctd)
dPc
dtc
(8)
Intuitively, both dividend and corporate taxes reduce the prots earned by old view rms in
the same way. The total revenue obtained from the two taxes is (td(1   tc) + tc)Pc, leading to
the formula in (8).
This analysis yields two general lessons about eciency costs that we will revisit below.
First, dividend taxation has an eciency cost only for rms which nance investment from new
equity issues, whereas corporate taxation has an eciency cost for both types of rms. Because
most investment is accounted for by rms with large amounts of retained earnings, this leads
to the view that dividend taxes are a more ecient instrument for raising tax revenue than
corporate taxes. Second, when one starts from a situation with no taxes, the introduction of a
small corporate tax has a second-order (i.e., small) eciency cost, as does the introduction of a
small dividend tax for old view rms.
7The main predictions of the old and new view models are summarized on the left side
of Table 1 The central assumption underlying these results is that rms' managers choose
policies solely to maximize rm value. This assumption contrasts with the modern corporate
nance literature, which emphasizes the tension between executives' and shareholders' interests
in explaining corporate behavior and payout policies. The next section incorporates these
considerations into the model.
3 An Agency Model of Firm Behavior
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to cash-rich rms, i.e. those with (1  
tc)f0(X) > r. Firms with (1 tc)f0(X) < r never pay dividends. Since our goal is to construct
a model consistent with recent evidence on dividend payout behavior, it is the behavior of cash-
rich rms that is of greatest interest.10 The predictions of the agency model are summarized
in the right half of Table 1.
3.1 Setup
The source of agency problems in corporations is a divergence between the objectives of man-
agers and shareholders. We model the source of the divergence as a \pet project" that generates
no prots for shareholders but yields utility to the manager. In particular, the manager can
now do three things with the rm's cash X: pay out dividends D, invest I in a \productive"
project that yields net prots f(I) for shareholders, or invest J in a pet project that gives the
manager private benets of g(J).11 Assume that both f and g are strictly concave.
The function g should be interpreted as a reduced-form means of capturing divergences
between the managers' and shareholders' objectives. For example, the utility g(J) may arise
from allocation of funds to perks, tunneling, a taste for empire building, or a preference for
projects that lead to a \quiet life".12 While there is debate in corporate nance about which of
10The working paper version (Chetty and Saez 2007) extends the eciency analysis to the case with equity
issues.
11The manager returns the capital used for investment in the pet project (J) back to the shareholders in
period 1.
12There is a large literature in corporate nance providing evidence for agency models. Recent examples
include Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Empirical
studies have also provided support for the agency theory as an explanation of why rms pay dividends (see e.g.,
Lang and Litzenberger 1989, Christie and Nanda 1994, LaPorta et al. 2000, Fenn and Liang 2001, Desai, Foley,
and Hines 2007).
8these elements of g(J) is most important, the underlying structure that determines g(J) does
not matter for our analysis.
Manager's Objective. The agency problem arises because shareholders cannot observe real
investment opportunities and have to let the manager choose I, J, and D. Shareholders push
managers toward prot maximization through two channels: incentive pay and monitoring.
Incentive pay is achieved through features of the manager's compensation contract such as
share grants and bonuses. We model such nancial incentives by assuming that the shareholders
compensate the manager with a fraction  of the shares of the company. Monitoring eectively
reduces the manager's utility from the pet project because it increases the probability that
pet projects are detected and penalized. We model monitoring by assuming that   0
units of monitoring reduces the utility the manager derives from the pet project from g(J) to
g(J)=(1 + ).
Given the shareholders' choice of  and , the manager chooses I and D to maximize
V
M = (1   td) 

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + X   D
1 + r

+
1
1 + r

g(J)
1 + 
(9)
subject to the constraint I + J + D = X. Monitoring increases the weight managers put on
prots relative to the pet project by a factor 1+. Let ! = (1 td)(1+) denote the relative
weight that managers place on prots. When ! is low, the manager has little stake in the prots
of the rm and is therefore tempted to retain excess earnings and invest in the pet project.13
Shareholders' Objectives. Next, we model how shareholders choose the level of monitoring
(). Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986), each shareholder who chooses to monitor the rm
incurs a cost of monitoring, whereas the benets of better manager behavior accrue to all
shareholders. There are N shareholders, each of whom owns a fraction i of the shares (so that
PN
1 i = 1 ). Each shareholder chooses a level of monitoring i  0. The total monitoring
level is  =
P
i.
Shareholders incur a xed cost k if they monitor the rm, i.e. if they set i > 0. In
addition, they pay a convex and increasing variable cost c(i) to do i units of monitoring,
where c0(i = 0) = 0. Each shareholder chooses i to maximize his net prots
Vi = (1   td)i 

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + X   D
1 + r

  k  1(i > 0)   c(i) (10)
13The pet project g(J) is presumably small relative to the rm's productive project f(I). However, ! is also
likely to be small in large publicly traded corporations, where executives own a small fraction of total shares
and diuse shareownership can lead to a low level of monitoring. Combining a small pet project g(J) with a
small ! can make the manager deviate substantially from the shareholders' optimal investment level.
9where 1(i > 0) is an indicator function. In the Nash equilibrium,  is determined such that
each shareholder's choice of i is a best response to the others' behavior. It is well known from
the public goods literature that monitoring will be below the social optimum (i.e., the level
that would be chosen if one shareholder owned the entire rm) in equilibrium.14 There is a
threshold level  such that small shareholders with i <  will not monitor the rm, while large
shareholders with i >  do monitor. Since the number of large shareholders is typically small,
it is natural to assume that these individuals cooperatively choose the level of monitoring  by
forming a \board of directors" that is in charge of monitoring the manager. Let B denote the
total fraction of shares held by the board of directors. The board chooses  to maximize its
joint prots net of monitoring costs:
V
B = (1   td)B 

D(!) +
(1   tc)f(I(!)) + X   D(!)
1 + r

  c() (11)
Ownership Structure. To close the model, we must specify how the rm's ownership struc-
ture ( and B) is determined. We draw a distinction between the short-run positive analysis
and the long-run eciency analysis in the specication of the rm's ownership structure. In
the short run, ownership structures are relatively stable in practice.15 Since the evidence on
dividend payout behavior we are attempting to explain concerns the eect of the 2003 dividend
tax reform within a two year horizon, we take  and B as xed in our positive analysis. In
the longer run, and particularly when new rms are started,  and B are presumably en-
dogenous to the tax regime. In the eciency analysis in section 5, we model how  and B
are determined. Allowing for endogenous ownership structure is particularly important in the
eciency analysis because the deadweight cost of taxation depends critically on how  and B
are determined.
3.2 Manager Behavior
We now characterize the manager's behavior as a function of his weight on prots ! = (1  
td)(1 + ). The manager chooses I and D to
max
I;D0
!

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + X   D
1 + r

+
g(X   I   D)
1 + r
.
14The Coasian solution (Coase 1960) is unlikely to emerge in this setting because of transaction costs in
coordinating many small shareholders.
15Chetty and Saez (2007) present evidence that managerial and board share ownership is much more stable
than dividend payments in the three years after the 2003 dividend tax cut.
10Assume that g0(0) > !f0(X), which guarantees an interior optimum in investment behavior.
Then I and D are determined by the following rst-order conditions:
(1   tc)!f
0(I) = g
0(X   I   D) (12)
!  r  g
0(X   I   D) with strict equality i D > 0 (13)
Let D(!) and I(!) denote the dividend and investment choices of the manager as a function of
!. To characterize the properties of these functions, dene the threshold
! =
g0(X   I)
r
> 0;
where I denotes the optimal investment level from the shareholders' perspective: (1 tc)f0(I) =
r. Note that ! is a monotonic decreasing function of X. We therefore label rms with ! > !
as \very high cash" rms and those with ! < ! but (1   tc)f0(X) > r as \high cash" in Table
1.
Lemma 1 D(!) and I(!) follow threshold rules:
 If !  ! then D(!) = 0 and I(!) is chosen such that (1   tc)!f0(I) = g0(X   I).
 If ! > ! then I(!) = I and D(!) > 0 is chosen such that !  r = g0(X   I   D).
Proof. Consider !  !. Suppose the rm sets D > 0. Then the rst order conditions (13)
and (12) imply that (1 tc)f0(I) = r and hence I = I. This implies ! r = g0(X  I  D) >
g0(X   I) = !  r, contradicting the supposition. Hence !  ! ) D(!) = 0.
Now consider ! > !. Suppose the rm sets D = 0. Then the rst order conditions (12)
and (13) imply that (1   tc)f0(I)  r and hence I  I. This implies !  r  g0(X   I) 
g0(X   I) = !  r, contradicting the supposition. Hence ! > ! ) D(!) > 0, and (13) yields
the desired expression for D(!). QED.
Figure 1 illustrates the threshold rules that the manager follows by plotting D(!), I(!),
and J(!) with quadratic production functions when tc = 0. When ! is below the threshold
value !, the marginal value of the rst dollar of dividends is negative in the manager's objective
function. The optimal level of dividends is therefore zero, the corner solution. Intuitively, if
managers have a suciently weak interest in prot maximization, they retain as much money
as possible for pet projects and do not pay dividends. For ! above !, further increases in
11the weight on prots ! lead to increases in dividends and reductions in pet investment on the
intensive margin:
D
0(!) =  
r
g00(J(!))
> 0 for ! > ! (14)
Now consider the manager's investment choice. When !  !, the manager pays no dividends,
and splits retained earnings between investment in the prot-generating project and the pet
project. He chooses I to equate his private marginal returns of investing in the two projects, as
in equation (12). An increase in ! increases productive investment I and reduces pet investment
J:
I
0(!) =  
(1   tc)f0(I(!))
(1   tc)!f00(I(!)) + g00(X   I(!))
> 0 for ! < ! (15)
Once ! > !, the manager has enough cash to pay a dividend to shareholders. He sets the
investment level such that (1   tc)f0(I) = r, implying that I is xed at I for ! > !. In-
tuitively, the manager would only pay a dividend if his private return to further investment
in the protable project was below the interest rate. Since the tradeo between dividends
and protable investment is the same for managers and shareholders, the manager only begins
to pay a dividend once he has reached the optimal level of investment from the shareholder's
perspective, I.
3.3 Board Behavior
In the short run, the board's only decision is to choose the level of monitoring. The board
takes B as xed and chooses  to maximize
V
B = (1   td)B  Pd(!)   c() (16)
where Pd(!) = D(!) + [(1   tc)f(I(!)) + X   D(!)]=(1 + r) denotes the rm's total payout
as a function of !. Because both D and I are (weakly) increasing in !, Pd(!) is also (weakly)
increasing in !. We have d!=d = (1   td). Hence, the rst order condition with respect to 
is:
c
0() = (1   td)B  P
0
d(!)  (1   td). (17)
Intuitively, the board chooses  such that the marginal increase in the board's share of prots
by raising ! is oset by the marginal cost of monitoring. The second-order condition for an
interior maximum is:
(1   td)B  P
00
d(!)  [(1   td)]
2   c
00() < 0: (18)
12Since c0( = 0) = 0 by assumption, the optimal  is always in the interior, and hence (18) must
be satised at the optimal level of monitoring (td).16 This second-order condition turns out
to be useful for the comparative statics analysis below.
4 Positive Analysis: Eects of Dividend Taxation
We now characterize the eect of dividend tax changes on rm behavior to show that the agency
model explains the four empirical ndings discussed in the introduction as well as other evidence.
For any variable x 2 fD;I;Jg,
dx
dtd
=
dx
d!
d!
dtd
because td aects the manager's objective only through his weight on prots !. We characterized
dx
d! in the previous section. As ! = (1 + )(1   td), we have
d!
dtd
=  (1 + ) + (1   td) 
d
dtd
(19)
To calculate
d
dtd, implicitly dierentiate the board's rst-order-condition for  in (17) to obtain:
d
dtd
=  
B[2(1   td)P 0
d(!) + [(1   td)]2(1 + )P 00
d(!)]
c00   P 00
d  B(1   td)  [(1   td)]2 : (20)
Combining (19) and (20) leads to:
d!
dtd
=  
2B2(1   td)2P 0
d(!) + (1 + )c00
c00   P 00
d  B(1   td)  [(1   td)]2 < 0: (21)
The board's second-order condition for  in (18) implies that the denominator of this expression
is positive. The numerator is positive because Pd is increasing in ! and c is convex. Equation
(21) therefore shows that a reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increase in the weight
! that managers put on prots through two channels. First, a decrease in td mechanically
increases the net stake (1   td) that the manager has in the rm, eectively by reducing
the government's stake (td) in the rm's prots. Second, a decrease in td generally increases
the level of monitoring  by the board.17 Intuitively, monitoring rises because the return to
monitoring is increased { since the external shareholders' net stake (1   td)B also rises when
td falls { while the cost of monitoring is unchanged.
16The second order condition could hold with equality, a knife-edge case that we rule out by assumption.
17It is possible that
d
dtd > 0 if the third derivatives g000(J), f000(I), c000() are suciently large in magnitude.
When f, g, and c are quadratic,
d
dtd is unambiguously negative. Hence, barring sharp changes in the local
curvature of the production functions, monitoring falls with the dividend tax rate.
13Given that d!
dtd < 0, it is straightforward to characterize the short-run eect of dividend
taxation on rm behavior. Because the manager follows a threshold rule in !, changes in td
lead to both intensive and extensive margin responses. We therefore analyze the eects of a
discrete dividend tax cut from td = t1 to td = t2 < t1 on a rm's behavior. Let x = x(t2) x(t1)
denote the change in a variable x caused by the tax cut, and note that ! = !(t2) !(t1) > 0
from (21).
Proposition 1 A dividend tax cut (t2 < t1) has the following eects on behavior for a cash-rich
rm:
(i) If !(t2)  !: D = 0, I > 0, J < 0; and I + J = 0.
(ii) If !(t1) < ! < !(t2): D > 0, I > 0; J < 0; and I + J < 0.
(iii) If !  !(t1): D > 0, I = 0; and J < 0.
Proof.
(i) When !(t2)  !, D(t2) = 0 by Lemma 1. Since !(t2) > !(t1), D(t1) = 0 also. Therefore
D = 0. Since I + J + D = X, and X is xed, it follows that I + J = 0. Finally, (15)
implies that dI
dtd = dI
d!
d!
dtd < 0 when !  !. Hence, I > 0 and J =  I < 0.
(ii) When !(t1) < ! < !(t2), Lemma 1 implies D(t1) = 0 while D(t2) > 0. Hence
D > 0. Since D > 0, I + J =  D < 0. By Lemma 1, I(t2) = I while I(t1)
satises (1 tc)!(t1)f0(I(t1)) = g0(X  I(t1)). Since !(t1)r < g0(X  I(t1)) by (13), it follows
that (1   tc)f0(I(t1)) > r = (1   tc)f0(I), which implies I(t1) < I(t2). Hence I > 0 and
J =  D   I < 0.
(iii) When !  !(t1), I(t1) = I(t2) = I because !(t2) > !(t1). Equation (14) implies that
dD
dtd = dD
d!
d!
dtd < 0 when ! > !. Hence t2 < t1 ) D > 0. Finally, J =  D < 0. QED.
Proposition 1 shows that the dividend tax cut (weakly) increases dividend payments for
all cash-rich rms because it raises the weight !(td) that managers place on prots. The
eect diers across three regions of !. For managers who place a very low weight on prots
(!(t2) < !), dividend payments remain undesirable after the tax cut and D = 0. The second
region consists of rms who were non-payers prior to the tax cut (!(t1) < !), but cross the
threshold for paying when the tax rate is lowered to t2. These rms initiate dividend payments
after the tax cut. The third region consists of rms who had ! high enough that they were
already paying dividends prior to the tax cut. The tax cut leads these rms to place greater
14weight on net-of-tax prots relative to the pet project, and therefore leads to increases in the
level of dividends. Note that these changes in dividend payout policies occur in period 0 itself.
This is consistent with the evidence that many rms announced dividend increases in the weeks
after the 2003 tax reform was enacted.
Now consider the eect of the dividend tax cut on investment behavior. The tax cut increases
the net-of-tax return to the prot-generating project while leaving the return to pet investment
unaected. As a result, the manager substitutes from investing in perks to the prot-generating
project, and I (weakly) increases while J falls. In the rst region, where !(t2) < !, the manager
shifts toward I from J but total investment (I +J) is unchanged. In the second region, where
the rm initiates a dividend payment, investment in I rises to the shareholders' optimum I,
while investment in J is reduced to nance the dividend payment and the increase in I. In this
region, total investment falls when the tax rate is cut. Finally, when ! > !(t1), the manager
maintains I at I and reduces investment in J to increase the dividend payment.
An interesting implication of these results is that a dividend tax cut weakly lowers total
investment I + J for cash-rich rms with an agency problem. Total investment, I + J, is the
measure that is typically observed empirically since it is dicult to distinguish the components
of investment in existing datasets. This prediction contrasts with the old view model, where
a tax cut raises investment and with the new view model, where a tax cut has no eect on
investment. Intuitively, a tax cut reduces the incentive for cash-rich rms to (ineciently)
over-invest in the pet project. It is important to note that the same result does not apply to
cash-constrained rms in the agency model: A tax cut raises equity issues and productive (as
well as unproductive) investment by such rms. Hence, a dividend tax cut leads to an (e-
ciency increasing) reallocation of capital and investment across rms, but its eect on aggregate
investment is ambiguous. This result is potentially consistent with the large empirical literature
on investment and the user cost of capital, which has failed to identify a robust relationship
between tax rates and aggregate investment (see e.g., Chirinko 1993, Desai and Goolsbee 2004).
Next, we examine how the eect of the tax cut on dividend payments varies across rms with
dierent ownership structures. We again distinguish between extensive and intensive margin
responses.
Proposition 2 Heterogeneity of Dividend Response to Tax Cut (t2 < t1) by Ownership Struc-
ture:
15(i) Extensive Margin: Likelihood of Initiation. If !(t1) < !, initiation likelihood increases with
 and B:
 If D > 0 for  then D > 0 for 0 > 
 If D > 0 for B then D > 0 for 0
B > B
(ii) Extensive Margin: Size of Initiation. If !(t1) < ! < !(t2): @D
@ > 0, @D
@B > 0.
(iii) Intensive Margin. If !  !(t1) and g and c are quadratic: @D
@ > 0, @D
@B > 0.
Proof.
(i) The result follows directly from the eect of  and B on !. Observe that
@!
@
= (1   td)(1 + ) + (1   td)
@
@
=
(1 + )(1   td)c00 + P 0
dB(1   td)3
c00   P 00
d  B(1   td)  [(1   td)]2 > 0.
using the second-order condition for  in (18). Similarly,
@!
@B
= (1   td)
@
@B
=
2(1   td)3P 0
d(!)
c00   P 00
d  B(1   td)  [(1   td)]2 > 0
Note that D > 0 at a given  ) D(!(t2;)) > 0. Since @!
@ > 0, we know that !(t2;0) >
!(t2;). From (14), we have @D
@! > 0, which in turn implies D(!(t2;0)) > D(!(t2;)) > 0 )
D > 0 for 0. Exploiting the result that @!
@B > 0 yields the analogous result for B.
(ii) When !(t1) < ! < !(t2), D(t1) = 0 and hence D = D(t2). It follows that @D
@x =
@D(t2)
@x = @D
@!
@!
@x for x 2 f;Bg. We know that @D
@! > 0 from (14). Since @!
@ > 0 and @!
@B > 0
from (i), it follows that
@D(t2)
@ > 0 and
@D(t2)
@B > 0, which proves the claim.
(iii) When ! < !(t1), the dividend level is positive both at the initial and new tax rate and
hence there is an intensive-margin response. Using equation (21), we have
dD
dtd
=
dD
d!

d!
dtd
=
r
g00(J(!))

2B2(1   td)2P 0
d(!) + (1 + )c00
c00   P 00
d  B(1   td)  [(1   td)]2 (22)
When ! < !, Pd(!) = D(!) +
(1 tc)f(I)+X D
1+r . Since g00(J(!)) is constant when g is
quadratic, we have D0(!) =  r=g00 constant and hence D00(!) = 0 and hence P 0
d(!) is also
constant and P 00
d(!) = 0. Equation (22) therefore simplies to
dD
dtd
=
r
g00

(1 + )   2B
2(1   td)
2 r
g00  c00

Recognizing that c00 > 0 and g00 < 0 are constant, we have:
D =
r
g00


Z t2
t1
(1 + (td))dtd +
2
3
B
2[(1   t2)
3   (1   t1)
3]
r
g00  c00

:
16Because t1 > t2, the rst term inside the curly brackets is negative. The second term inside the
curly brackets is also negative because t1 > t2 and g00 < 0. Because, the multiplicative factor
r=g00 outside the curly brackets is negative, we have: @D
@ > 0 and @D
@B > 0. QED.
Figure 2a plots D against  in two dividend tax regimes, with t1 = 35% and t2 = 20%
and the corporate tax tc = 0. The gure illustrates the three results in Proposition 2. First,
among the set of rms who were non-payers prior to the tax cut, those with large executive
shareholding (high ) are more likely to initiate dividend payments after the tax cut. This is
because managers with higher  are closer to the threshold (!) of paying dividends to begin
with, and are therefore more likely to cross that threshold. Second, conditional on initiating,
rms with higher  initiate larger dividends. Because D(t2), the optimal dividend conditional
on paying, is rising in , the size of the dividend increase, D = D(t2), is larger for rms with
higher values of  in this region. Third, among the rms who were already paying dividends
prior to the tax cut, the intensive-margin increase in the level of dividends is generally larger
for rms with higher .18 Intuitively, the manager's incentives are more sensitive to the tax
rate when he owns a larger fraction of the rm. These three results apply analogously to the
board's shareholding (B), as shown in Figure 2b. A change in td has a greater eect on 
when B is large, leading to a larger dividend response.
Auxiliary Predictions. The agency model predicts that rms with more assets and cash
holdings (higher X) are more likely to initiate dividend payments following a tax cut.19 In
contrast, neoclassical models that nest the old and new views (Sinn 1991) predict that rms
with higher assets will respond less to a tax cut. Chetty and Saez (2005) document that rms
with higher assets or cash holdings were more likely to initiate dividends after the 2003 tax
reform, consistent with the agency model.
The importance of the interests of \key players" (executives and large external shareholders)
is underscored by Chetty and Saez's nding that rms with large non-taxable shareholders
(such as pension funds) were much less likely to change dividend payout behavior in response
to the 2003 tax reform. Although we have not allowed for heterogeneity in tax rates across
18This result holds as long as there are no sharp changes in the local curvature of the production functions.
If g000(J) and c000() are suciently large in magnitude, it is possible to have @
2D
@td@B > 0.
19Firms with higher X are closer to the threshold of paying dividends because ! is falling in X and  is rising
in X. A tax cut is therefore more likely to make rms with higher X cross the threshold and initiate dividend
payments.
17shareholders in our stylized model, it is straightforward to show that the introduction of non-
taxable shareholders would generate this prediction. If the board includes non-taxable large
shareholders, a change in td has a smaller impact on the board's incentive to increase monitoring.
Hence, a tax cut causes a smaller increase in  and generates smaller D.
5 Eciency Costs of Dividend and Corporate Taxation
We divide our analysis of the eciency costs of dividend and corporate taxes into two parts.
We rst build intuition using a special case where ownership structure ( and B) is xed
and monitoring () is xed at 0. We then relax these assumptions and characterize eciency
costs when the manager's contract is endogenously determined. The lessons obtained from the
special case carry over to the general model with some qualications.
5.1 Fixed Contracts
When  is xed at 0, total surplus in the economy (W) is simply the sum of the shareholders'
payo, the manager's payo, and government revenue from the dividend and corporate taxes:
W = V
M + V
S + tdPd(!) + tcPc(!)
= (1   td)

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + X   D
1 + r

+
g(J)
1 + r
+(1   )(1   td)Pd (!) + tdPd(!) + tcPc(!)
where Pd = D +
(1 tc)f(I)+X D
1+r and Pc = f(I)=(1 + r) denote the dividend and corporate tax
bases as above.
Recognizing that D and I are chosen by the manager to maximize his own surplus, we
exploit envelope conditions and obtain the following expressions for the marginal excess burden
of raising the two tax rates:
dW
dtd
= tc
dPc
dtd
+ td
dPd
dtd
+ +(1   td)(1   )
dPd
dtd
(23)
dW
dtc
= tc
dPc
dtc
+ td(
dPd
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc
) + (1   td)(1   )(
dPd
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc
) (24)
where
@Pd
@tc =  Pc denotes the mechanical eect of increasing tc on the rm's payout as above.
The rst two terms in each of these formulas correspond exactly to those in the equations for
deadweight loss in the neoclassical model in (4) and (5). These terms reect the traditional
18Harberger-type distortions created by taxes because the rm under-invests relative to the social
optimum. Although these terms are identical to those in the neoclassical models, the elasticities
themselves may dier: even cash-rich rms have
dPd
dtd < 0, in contrast with the new view model.
The third term in the two formulas arises from the agency problem ( < 1). This term
reects the externality that the manager imposes on other shareholders by under-providing
dividends and investing in the pet project. An increase in tax rates exacerbates this pre-existing
distortion. Note that unlike the Harberger terms, which are second-order (proportional to td
and tc), the agency term is rst-order. This rst-order term disappears if td is set at t
d such
that (1 t
d) = 1, as t
d+(1 t
d)(1 ) = 0. The dividend subsidy t
d < 0 exactly corrects the
externality due to the misalignment between managers' and shareholders' objectives. Absent
revenue requirements, setting td = t
d < 0 and tc = 0 maximizes social welfare. Rather than
taxing dividends, it would be desirable to implement a Pigouvian dividend subsidy to correct the
externality that arises from the misalignment between managers' and shareholders' objectives.
In contrast, there is no such rationale for subsidizing corporate prots in the agency model.
As in the neoclassical model, it is helpful to distinguish rms that pay dividends in period
0 from those that do not to gain more insight into the excess burden formulas. First consider
\very high cash" rms that have X large enough so that ! > !. By Lemma 1, these rms
pay dividends in period 0, set I = I(tc), and set J such that (1   td)r = g0(J). For such
rms, protable investment is unaected by the dividend tax ( @I
@td = 0), implying
dPd
dtd = r
1+r
dD
dtd.
Conversely, the corporate tax does not aect pet project investment ( @J
@tc = 0) because tc does
not aect the tradeo between D and J. Because the manager sets I to maximize Pd, the only
eect of a change in the corporate tax on total dividend payouts is the mechanical eect:
dPd
dtc
=  Pc +

(1   tc)f0(I)
1 + r
@I
@tc
+
r
1 + r
dD
dtc

=  Pc  
r
1 + r
@J
@tc
=  Pc =
@Pd
@tc
.
Combining these results, we obtain the following expressions for marginal excess burden for
dividend-paying (very high cash) rms:
dW
dtd
= [td + (1   td)(1   )]
dPd
dtd
(25)
dW
dtc
= tc
dPc
dtc
(26)
The dividend tax has a rst-order deadweight cost whereas the corporate tax has a second-order
deadweight burden that coincides with that in the neoclassical new view model. Intuitively, for
19rms that have sucient cash holdings to pay dividends, investment is set at the optimal level
from the shareholders' perspective. The agency problem only distorts the tradeo between
period 0 dividends and pet project investment. Dividend taxes encourage managers to increase
pet project investment, exacerbating this pre-existing agency problem. In contrast, corporate
taxes do not aect the tradeo between pet investment and period 0 dividends.
Now consider high cash rms that do not issue equity but also do not pay dividends (! <
!). Such rms set I such that (1   tc)(1   td)f0(I) = g0(X   I). For these rms, dividend
and corporate taxes both distort the return to investment in the same way, implying dPc
dtd = dPc
dtc .
The eects of td and tc on the dividend tax base are fully determined by their eects on prots,
implying
dPd
dtd = (1   tc)dPc
dtd and
dPd
dtc =  Pc + (1   tc)dPc
dtc . Combining these results, we obtain
dW
dtd
=
dW
dtc
= (tc + td   tctd)
dPc
dtc
+ (1   td)(1   tc)(1   )
dPc
dtc
(27)
The rst term in this formula coincides with that in equation (8) for excess burden for rms
that do not pay dividends in the neoclassical (old view) model. The second term is due to the
agency problem, which increases the excess burden of both the corporate and dividend tax for
rms with X < X. For managers choosing between untaxed pet project investment and taxed
protable investment at the margin, both the dividend and corporate taxes distort investment
behavior. Because these managers are already under-investing in I from the shareholders'
perspective, both taxes exacerbate this pre-existing distortion to the same degree.
How are the two lessons about eciency costs obtained from the neoclassical analysis in
section 2 aected by agency problems? First, dividend taxation always generates deadweight
loss, even for cash-rich rms. Second, the dividend tax creates rst-order deadweight costs by
distorting dividend payout decisions, whereas the corporate tax generates second-order eciency
costs for rms that pay dividends. To see the importance of the distinction between the rst-
order and second-order terms, consider the marginal excess burden of raising the dividend tax
from the current rate of td = 15%. In the Execucomp data used in Chetty and Saez (2005),
total executive share ownership averages less than  = 0:03 in all years.20 In equation (25)
for dividend-paying rms, the rst-order agency term (1   td)(1   ) therefore accounts for
(1 td)(1 )
td+(1 td)(1 ) = 84% of the marginal excess burden of a dividend tax increase. Hence, agency
20Although this calculation focuses solely on stock ownership, accounting for other forms of incentive-based
pay is unlikely to raise  signicantly. Existing studies have measured  more broadly by computing the change
in the wealth of a CEO when his rm's value increases by $1. These studies estimate that  is less than 1% on
average for CEOs of publicly traded corporations in the U.S. (see Murphy 1999 for a survey).
20eects are likely to be the primary driver of any eciency costs of dividend taxes.
A useful feature of the formulas for excess burden in (25) and (26) is that they are functions
of a small set of parameters that can in principle be estimated empirically, such as the elasticities
of dividend payments and corporate prots with respect to tax rates. The primitives of the
model, such as the pet project payo g(J), aect eciency costs only through the high-level
elasticities that enter the formula. Estimating these structural parameters would be dicult as
they represent reduced forms of complex contracts and payos for shareholders and management.
The formulas for excess burden we have derived above ignore the possibility that the rm may
return prots to shareholders through share repurchases instead of dividends. In the appendix,
we extend the model to allow for costly share repurchases, as in Poterba and Summers (1985).
We obtain the same excess burden formulas as those above, except that the rst-order agency
term depends upon the eect of tax changes on total payout. Intuitively, the cash left over
for pet project investment is determined by total payout, and not just dividends. Therefore,
an increase in td has rst-order deadweight costs if it reduces total payout and does not simply
induce substitution between share repurchases and dividends.21 An increase in tc continues
to have second-order deadweight costs for very high cash rms. The main limitation of this
approach to incorporating share repurchases is that it relies on an ad-hoc cost to explain why
rms pay dividends despite the tax advantage of repurchases. Micro-founded models of share
repurchases may have dierent welfare implications.
5.2 Endogenous Contracts
We now show that the formulas derived above generalize to a model with endogenous contracts
and monitoring. We begin by modeling how the manager's contract () is determined and then
turn to the eciency analysis, which takes into account the impact of taxes on this contract.
Determination of Manager's Contract. We model the determination of the manager's con-
tract using the standard principal-agent framework in the corporate nance literature with a
risk-neutral principal and risk-averse manager. The critical assumption we make is that this
contract is chosen by the board of directors, who initially own a fraction B of the rm's shares
and whose objective is to maximize their own prots net of monitoring costs. The remaining
shares 1   B are owned by small shareholders whose interests are not directly represented on
21In Chetty and Saez (2006), we present suggestive evidence that companies did not substitute dividends for
repurchases. However, further empirical work is needed to estimate this substitution elasticity precisely.
21the board of directors. This captures the fundamental conict between ownership and manage-
ment: small minority shareholders are passive investors who do not participate in management
decisions.
For reasons we describe below, it is important to ensure that the board has a set of tools
that spans the set of tax instruments available to the government. We therefore expand the
manager's compensation contract to include three components. First, the board can compensate
the manager by giving him a fraction  of the company's shares. Second, the manager receives
a xed salary S independent of prots and dividends. The salary S is paid in period 2 before
the rm is liquidated. Third, the manager receives a bonus equal to a share b of after-tax
corporate prots (1 tc)f(I) generated in period 2. In addition to these three choice variables,
the board continues to choose the level of monitoring  as above.
The board faces a tradeo in setting the manager's contract because he is averse to risk;
if the manager were risk neutral, he would buy the entire rm to resolve the agency problem
and maximize total surplus. For tractability, we use a standard CARA-Normal framework to
model the risk the manager faces. In particular, assume that the rm's prots are given by
f(I) + " where "  N(0;2). In this generalized model, the manager's total consumption is
V
M = (1   td)

X   I   J +
(1   tc)(1   b)(f(I) + ") + I + J   S
1 + r

+
S
1 + r
+
(1   tc)b(f(I) + ")
1 + r
+
g(J)
(1 + r)(1 + )
.
It is convenient to rewrite this expression as
V
M = ~ 
"
X   I   J +
~ (f(I) + ") + I + J   S
1 + r
#
+
S
1 + r
+
g(J)
(1 + r)(1 + )
,
where ~  = (1 td) and ~  = (1 tc)[(1 b)+b=~ ]. Introducing ~  and ~  allows us to eliminate
tc and td from the manager's objective, which is another way to see that the government and
private sector have equivalent tools. Any change managerial incentives caused by changes in
government policies can in principle be fully undone by changes in the manager's contract.
The manager's utility function is u(V M) =   1
e V M, where  denotes the level of absolute
risk aversion. Exploiting the CARA-Normal properties, the expected value received by the
manager can be written as
EV
M = ~ 
"
X   I   J +
~ f(I) + I + J   S
1 + r
#
+
S
1 + r
+
g(J)
(1 + r)(1 + )
  
2
2
~ 2  ~ 2
(1 + r)2:
22Note that the maximization problem of the manager who chooses I and J to maximize EV M is
identical to the problem in the deterministic model solved in Lemma 1. Hence I and J depend
upon ~ , ~ , and .
The board chooses S, b, , and  to maximize the board's share value, taking into account
the manager's incentive constraints and participation constraint EV M  0. As above, denote by
Pc = f(I)=(1+r) the corporate tax base and Pd = X I J+[(1 tc)(1 b)f(I)+I+J S]=(1+r)
the dividend tax base. Note that we can rewrite Pd as
Pd(~ ; ~ ;;tc) = X   I   J +
1 tc ~ ~ 
1 ~  f(I) + I + J   S
1 + r
,
where the dependence on tc captures the mechanical change in Pd holding xed the manager's
contract (~ ; ~ ;). Note that
@Pd
@tc =   Pc
1 ~ . With this notation, the board chooses (~ ; ~ ;) to
maximize:
WS = (B(1   td)   ~ )Pd(~ ; ~ ;;tc)   c(): (28)
The minority shareholders surplus is:
WM = (1   B)(1   td)Pd(~ ; ~ ;;tc): (29)
Since the manager's surplus is pinned at zero by his participation constraint, total surplus in
the economy (W) is the sum of the shareholders' welfare and government revenue:
W = tdPd + tcPc + WS + WM:
Eciency Cost. Using the envelope theorem, we have dWS=dtd =  B  Pd and dWS=dtc =
(B(1   td)   ~ )
@Pd
@tc =  Pc
B(1 td) ~ 
1 ~  . We therefore have dWM=dtd =  (1   B)  Pd + (1  
B)(1   td)dPd=dtd and dWM=dtc = (1   B)(1   td)dPd=dtc. Combining these results yields:
dW
dtd
= tc
dPc
dtd
+ [td + (1   td)(1   B)]
dPd
dtd
(30)
dW
dtc
= tc
dPc
dtc
+ [td + (1   td)(1   B)] 

dPd
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc

(31)
Equations (30) and (31) coincide with those in the special case above, replacing  with B. To
understand these equations, it is useful to distinguish between two cases: B = 1 and B < 1.
Case 1: B = 1. When there are no minority shareholders, the rst-order terms in (30)
and (31) disappear and deadweight burden becomes a second-order function of the tax rate
23as in the neoclassical old view model. The marginal deadweight cost of taxation is small at
low tax rates even though the contract between the manager and board has  < 1, leading
to inecient pet project investment and under-provision of dividends by the manager. This
result contrasts with the intuition developed in the previous section that taxing a market with
a pre-existing distortion leads to a rst-order eciency cost, which is a classic result in public
nance (Auerbach 1985, Hines 1999, Auerbach and Hines 2003, Goulder and Williams 2003,
Kaplow 2008).
There are two reasons that our result diers from that of other studies in the tax litera-
ture. First, we have designed the model so that the government does not have an intrinsic
technological advantage in xing the agency problem relative to the private sector. Any change
in incentives for the manager that can be achieved by changing the tax system (td;tc) can be
achieved by changing the private contract (;b;S). Second, the contract between the manager
and the shareholders is constrained ecient when B = 1: absent taxes, the compensation of
the manager is designed to maximize surplus subject to the technological constraint that only
managers can make the investment and payout decisions for the rm. Hence, the size of the
pre-existing distortion due to agency problems is endogenously minimized by the private sector
when B = 1 in this model. In contrast, the pre-existing distortions analyzed in the previous
section and in the studies cited above are exogenously xed. The government has a techno-
logical advantage in xing these distortions { it can use a dividend subsidy whereas the private
sector cannot { and thus dividend taxes have rst-order costs.
The general lesson, which is of relevance beyond dividend taxation, is that identifying a
pre-existing distortion is not sucient to infer that government taxes or subsidies will have
rst-order eects on welfare. It is critical to understand the private sector's ability to alter
the size of the distortion, in particular whether the private sector has the same tools as the
government and whether the private sector reaches the second-best ecient outcome. In the
context of dividend taxation, there is no obvious reason that government intervention is a
superior method of resolving agency problems than the tools available to shareholders.22
Case 2: B < 1. When B < 1, the interests of diuse shareholders are ignored by the
22Governments may be able to aect the contracting technology in a way that the private sector itself cannot
achieve through regulation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For example, if shareholders rights are protected in
courts, shareholders may have more control over managers, reducing c() and leading to a rst-order eciency
gain. The key point is that dividend taxes do not aect contracting technology directly holding xed the
regulatory structure embodied by in the function c().
24board and the private contract no longer maximizes total private surplus. As a result, taxes
have rst-order eects, as shown by the (1   td)(1   B) terms in (30) and (31).23 As in
the xed contract case, setting td = t
d (where B(1   t
d) = 1) corrects the externality and
eliminates these rst-order terms. Setting td = t
d and tc = 0 thus maximizes social welfare
absent revenue constraints. With endogenous contracts, the size of the rst-order term in the
excess burden formulas is determined by B instead of . This is because the ultimate source of
the externality is that the large shareholders under-provide monitoring and pay-for-performance
incentives to the manager when B < 1.
The model can be further generalized to permit endogenous determination of the fraction
of large shareholders B, as shown in Chetty and Saez (2007). Large shareholders often buy
a large block of shares through tender oers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Such tender oers
are made in the self-interest of the acquirer and do not take into account the interests of the
remaining diuse shareholders. This creates an agency problem because B is determined in a
way that does not maximize total private surplus. As a result, dividend taxation continues to
generate rst order eciency costs and a dividend subsidy can be used to correct the externality.
The results with endogenous contracts explain why our formulas for excess burden dier
from that obtained in Gordon and Dietz's (2006) agency model. Gordon and Dietz assume
that the board of directors set the level of dividends on behalf of all shareholders, which is
analogous to assuming B = 1 in our model. This is the reason that the eciency cost of
dividend taxation takes the standard second-order Harberger form in their model.
6 Conclusion
The public nance literature on corporate taxation has focused primarily on models of prot-
maximizing rms. In contrast, since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the corporate nance litera-
ture has emphasized deviations from prot maximization by managers as a central determinant
of rm behavior. This paper has taken a step toward bridging this gap. We analyzed the eects
of dividend taxation in an agency model, and showed that it can explain many aspects of the
empirical evidence on rms' responses to taxation that pose problems for existing neoclassical
models.
23In the case with endogenous contracts, the corporate tax can have rst-order eects even for very high cash
rms because it distorts the manager's contract, which in turn aects payout decisions.
25We used this model to characterize the eciency cost of dividend taxation. Dividend
taxation has rst-order eciency costs when managers' interests dier from shareholders and
companies are owned by diuse shareholders { which is perhaps the most plausible description
of modern corporations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Our analysis suggests that the main source
of ineciency from increasing the dividend tax rate is the misallocation of capital by managers
because of reduced monitoring, and not the distortion to the overall level of investment empha-
sized in the \old view" model. From a policy perspective, if agency problems are prevalent,
dividend taxation should be used relatively little if the government has other tools { e.g., pro-
gressive income taxation integrated with corporate taxation { that have similar distributional
eects but do not create rst-order distortions.
We see two important directions for future research. First, while our model explains evi-
dence on the eects of dividend taxation, it does not directly explain other stylized facts about
dividends such as the smoothness of dividends, payment of dividends while issuing equity, and
the use of dividends despite the tax advantage of share repurchases. It is critical to build
a micro-founded model that explains this evidence without appealing to ad hoc costs to fully
understand the eects of dividend and corporate taxation. Second, our analysis calls for fur-
ther empirical work related to agency issues in corporate taxation. In our model, a dividend
tax cut raises eciency by improving the allocation of capital: rms with excess cash holdings
invest less following a tax cut, while cash-constrained rms invest more. Testing whether tax
reforms generate such heterogeneous investment responses across rms would shed light on the
empirical importance of this allocation eciency mechanism.
26Appendix: Incorporating Share Repurchases
Suppose the rm can return money to shareholders through untaxed share repurchases in
period 0, which we denote by R. Returning R to shareholders through repurchases has a cost
c(R) that is distributed across all shareholders and is increasing and convex.24
The neoclassical model in Section 2 can be extended to allow such share repurchases by
replacing equation (1) with
max
D;E
V = R   c(R) + (1   td)D   E +
(1   td)[(1   tc)f(X + E   D   R) + X   D   R] + E
1 + r
:
(32)
Cash-rich rms paying dividends D > 0 set R such that c0(R) = td so that an increase in
td increases R, creating partial substitution between dividends and share repurchases. Cash-
constrained rms that raise equity E > 0 do not repurchase shares. Intermediate rms may
repurchase shares. The eciency formulas (4) and (5) are unchanged.
In the agency model of Section 5.1 with exogenous  and no monitoring, let us focus on very
high cash rms that pay dividends D > 0 for simplicity. For such rms, the resource constraint
is I + J = X   D   R, and we can write the manager's value as
V
M = [R   c(R)] + (1   td)

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + I + J
1 + r

+
g(J)
1 + r
:
Denoting by D0 = D + R the total period 0 payout, we have I + J = X   D0 and
V
M = [tdR   c(R)] + (1   td)

D
0 +
(1   tc)f(I) + I + J
1 + r

+
g(J)
1 + r
:
This is the sum of the problem in the baseline agency model with D0 replacing D plus a separable
repurchase problem involving R that is equivalent to the repurchase problem in the neoclassical
model. The rst order condition for R is therefore c0(R) = td as in the neoclassical model
above. The rst order conditions for the other variables are identical to those in baseline model
without repurchases: (1   tc)f0(I) = r and
(1 td)r
1+r =
g0(J)
1+r . Hence, the key comparative static
results for the agency model in Section 3 and 4 hold with repurchases.
24In practice, share repurchases are taxed at a lower rate than dividends. It is straightforward to introduce a
tax rate ts on share repurchases without changing the analysis as the results do not depend upon the specication
of c(R).
27Now consider the eciency analysis. Social welfare is
W = V
M + V
S + tdPd + tcPc
= [R   c(R)] + (1   td)

D +
(1   tc)f(I) + I + J
1 + r

+
g(J)
1 + r
+(1   )(R   c(R)) + (1   )(1   td)Pd + tdPd + tcPc
where Pd = D +
(1 tc)f(I)+I+J
1+r and Pc = f(I)=(1 + r) denote the dividend and corporate tax
bases as above. The marginal excess burden of raising the dividend tax is
dW
dtd
= tc
dPc
dtd
+ td
dPd
dtd
+ (1   td)(1   )
dPd
dtd
+ (1   )(1   c
0(R))
dR
dtd
(33)
= tc
dPc
dtd
+ td
dPd
dtd
+ (1   td)(1   )
d(Pd + R)
dtd
(34)
where
d(Pd+R)
dtd is the eect of the dividend tax on total payout. This formula coincides with (23)
except that the rst-order term has
d(Pd+R)
dtd instead of
dPd
dtd . Intuitively, R is chosen optimally
by the manager from the shareholders' perspective, so the rst-order agency related term in the
excess burden formula depends only on the distortion in pet project investment. Pet project
investment is determined by total payout, not just dividend payments, and thus total payout is
what matters for the agency problem. In contrast, the standard Harberger terms are related
to distortions in the dividend tax base itself and therefore continue to have the same form as in
the model without repurchases.
Similarly, the excess burden of raising the corporate tax rate is:
dW
dtc
= td

dPd
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc

+ tc
dPc
dtc
+ (1   td)(1   )

d(Pd + R)
dtc
 
@Pd
@tc

:
As c0(R) = td, R is unaected by tc and therefore
d(Pd+R)
dtc =
dPd
dtc =  Pc =
@Pd
@tc . Hence, even
with share repurchases, corporate taxes have second-order deadweight burden for very high cash
rms:
dW
dtc
= tc
dPc
dtc
.
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31Initial Cash X Very High: r/(1-tc)>f'(X) and g'(X-I*)<ω r
Dividends D D=0 D=0 D>0,  f'(X-D)=r/(1-tc) D=0 D>0,   g'(X-I*-D)=ω(1+r)
Equity Issues E E>0, f'(X+E)=r/[(1-td)(1-tc)] E=0 E=0 E=0 E=0
Productive Investment I I>X,    f'(I)=r/[(1-td)(1-tc)] I=X,   f'(I)=f'(X) I<X,   f'(I)=r/(1-tc) g'(X-I)=(1-tc)ω f'(I),    (1-tc)f'(I)>r (1-tc)f'(I)=r (i.e., I=I*),    g'(J)=ω r
Effects of reducing No effect on D Intensive margin: No effect on D, E, I No effect on D, E, I Intensive margin: No effect on D and E, D increases, J decreases
dividend tax td I increases, E increases Extensive margin: Some firms shift to I increases, J decreases No effect on I and E
low cash regime, start issuing E Extensive margin: Some firms shift to
and increase I very high cash regime, start paying dividends
Heterogeneity of D none none none Extensive margin: higher likelihood and larger D Larger increase in D if exec. or board share
response to tax cut initiations if exec. or board share high high (if third derivatives of g, c small)
by ownership structure
Efficiency cost of td second-order none none first-order if α<1 first-order if α<1
dW/dtd=(tc+td-tctd)dPc/dtc dW/dtd=0 dW/dtd=0 dW/dtd=(tc+td-tctd)dPc/dtc+(1-td)(1-tc)(1-α)dPc/dtc dW/dtd=[td+(1-td)(1-α)]dPd/dtd
Efficiency cost of tc second-order none second-order first-order if α<1 second-order
dW/dtc=(tc+td-tctd)dPc/dtc dW/dtc=0 dW/dtc=tc dPc/dtc dW/dtd=(tc+td-tctd)dPc/dtc+(1-td)(1-tc)(1-α)dPc/dtc dW/dtc=tc dPc/dtc
Low:                                 
f'(X)>r/[(1-td)(1-tc)]
NOTES-- This table summarizes the firm's choice of dividends (D), equity issues (E), and investment (I) in the neoclassical and agency models. Behavior depends on the level of initial cash holding X, which
varies across the columns. I* denotes the optimal investment level from the shareholders' perspective given the corporate tax tc, which satisfies f'(I*)=r(1-tc). In the agency model, we only consider the case
where initial cash is high enough so that the firm does not issue equity. Positive predictions reported are for the model in Sections 3 and 4 with an exogenous manager share α and endogenous monitoring γ 
so that ω=α(1-td)(1+γ). The efficiency costs are reported for the special case in Section 5.1 with exogenous α and no monitoring. Section 5.2 shows that the formulas extend with endogenous α and
monitoring by substituting α for αB (share ownership of large shareholders). Note that the efficiency cost formulas ignore changes in the thresholds that define the low vs. high cash categories and therefore
apply only to firms in the interior of these categories.
Medium:                                     
r/[(1-td)(1-tc)]≥f'(X)≥r/(1-tc)
High:                  
r/(1-tc)>f'(X) High: r/(1-tc)>f'(X) and g'(X-I*)≥ω r
Table 1
Agency Model
Summary of Key Predictions: Neoclassical vs. Agency Models
New View Old View
Neoclassical ModelFigure 1
Manager’s Decision Rules as a Function of Weight on Profits 
ω: manager’s weight on profits
D
,
 
J
,
 
I
Profitable Investment (I)
Pet Investment (J)
Period 0 Dividends (D)
NOTE–This figure plots the manager’s optimal choice of dividends, profitable
investment, and pet project investment as a function of his weight on profits, .
The simulation assumes a total cash holding of X  2, profitable investment
production function fI  1
10 2I − I2
2 , pet production function gJ  1
100 2J − J2
2 ,
and interest rate r  10%.Figure 2a
Effect of Tax Cut on Dividends by Managerial Shareownership
α: fraction of shares owned by manager
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αB: fraction of shares owned by board
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Figure 2b
Effect of Tax Cut on Dividends by Board Shareownership
NOTE–These figures show how the effect of a dividend tax cut on dividends
varies across firms with different ownership structures. In Figure 2a, the lower
curve plots dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the manager ()
when the tax rate is 35%. The upper curve plots the same when the tax rate is
20%. Figure 2b plots dividends versus the fraction of shares owned by the board
of directors in the two tax regimes. Simulations use the same parametric
assumptions as in Figure 1 along with c  1
1000 2.